As solar panels, batteries, and inverter-based resources (IBRs) become a larger part of the electric grid, so does the need to address their growing cybersecurity risks. While distributed energy resources (DERs) enable flexibility and decarbonization, they also introduce thousands of new digital entry points—many of which weren’t designed with security in mind.
The truth is, most DERs and IBRs operate outside of mandatory regulations like NERC CIP. But that doesn’t mean they’re off the radar. As utilities increasingly rely on DERs to balance and stabilize the grid, attackers are noticing the gap—and looking for ways in.
What Makes DERs and IBRs Cyber Targets?
DERs are decentralized power resources: rooftop solar panels, battery storage, smart inverters, EVs feeding power back, and microgrids. IBRs are a major subset—resources that rely on inverters rather than traditional spinning generation. Because these devices are software-controlled and grid-connected, they’re vulnerable to cyber threats in ways conventional power systems are not.
Researchers have already found dozens of vulnerabilities in solar inverters and battery systems. These flaws range from weak authentication and unencrypted communications to exploitable firmware update channels—any one of which could allow an attacker to take over a device remotely.
Common Cyber Entry Points in DER Systems
- Insecure remote access portals
Many DER platforms include cloud-based dashboards or mobile apps for performance monitoring and control. But if those interfaces rely on default credentials or don’t enforce MFA, they can be easily compromised.
- Weak firmware update channels:
Some inverter systems allow firmware updates without verifying their source or integrity. That opens the door to malware injections that could manipulate energy output or disable safety systems.
- Vendor and aggregator risk:
DERs are rarely operated directly by the utility. Third-party aggregators or installers manage many with their own platforms and access credentials. If those parties don’t follow security best practices, their platforms become a single point of failure.
- Unsafe communication protocols:
Protocols like Modbus, DNP3, or IEEE 2030.5 are common in DER environments, but many of these were not designed with encryption or authentication, making them easy targets for command spoofing or data manipulation.
Real-World Example: 46 Inverter Vulnerabilities
A 2023 study uncovered 46 vulnerabilities in inverters from multiple manufacturers. These included exposed debug interfaces, hardcoded passwords, and firmware overwrite functionality. The researchers warned that a coordinated attack could result in grid instability or denial-of-service across large DER fleets.
Why This Matters for Utilities
Even if DER systems are behind the meter or owned by third parties, the grid still depends on their performance. A single compromised aggregator could push dangerous settings to thousands of inverters. If attackers target fleet-wide DER operations, the consequences might mirror those of a traditional substation compromise—but without the same regulatory protections in place.
What Can Be Done? Frameworks You Can Use Now
NIST CSF 2.0 offers a clear structure for securing DER environments, including guidance on:
-
Identifying assets and risk across DER systems
-
Protecting systems with access control, segmentation, and secure communications
-
Detecting anomalies in DER behavior or device data
-
Responding and recovering from cyber incidents involving DERs
-
Governing third-party and supply chain risk
Meanwhile, IEC 62443 provides deeper technical practices for industrial system security, including segmentation, access zones, and secure development lifecycle practices—all of which can apply directly to IBRs and DER components.
A Call to Action: Act Before It’s Mandated
NERC CIP may not apply to most DERs today, but federal guidance is evolving. More importantly, proactive utilities and DER operators are recognizing the importance of securing these systems now—before a major incident forces reactive regulation.
If you’re deploying or integrating DERs:
-
Treat DER platforms and components as critical OT
-
Require vendors and aggregators to follow secure development and access practices
-
Map DER communications and ensure segmentation
-
Monitor for emerging vulnerabilities in inverters, BESS, and cloud platforms
-
Include DERs in incident response and tabletop exercises
The Bottom Line
DERs aren’t just clean energy assets—they’re digital assets. And every digital asset is a potential attack surface. Whether you’re in operations, engineering, or cybersecurity, it’s time to look at inverter-based resources through a risk lens. Because securing DERs isn’t just about avoiding inconvenience—it’s about protecting the reliability and safety of the grid itself.